ANKASecure© produces digital signatures with keys whose algorithms the tenant’s policy governs — classical, post-quantum (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, FALCON) or composite signatures requiring both components to verify — and timestamps them against any RFC 3161 authority under a per-tenant usage policy (required, optional or disabled) beneath a deployment ceiling. The timestamp token is embedded in the signature as a JAdES signature timestamp (ETSI TS 119 182-1) in JWS JSON Serialization, and verification checks signature and timestamp, reporting the two verdicts side by side. When policy retires an algorithm, the RESIGN operation verifies the existing signatures and re-signs under a key with the new algorithm, and the signed, tamper-evident audit trail records the source and destination keys of each re-signature. ANKATech is not a qualified trust service provider, and the platform evidences records without archiving them.

A signature is only as old as its algorithm. Make it outlive it.

A contract signed today has to verify in 2036, and the algorithm that signed it may not be acceptable by then. ANKASecure© signs with keys whose algorithms the policy governs — classical, post-quantum or both — timestamps the signature against the authority you trust, and re-signs it under a new key when the policy says the algorithm has aged. Every signature and re-signature is in the signed audit trail.

Head of legal operationsCompliance officerCISO

Is this you

Three ways this lands on your desk

Records that must verify for a decade

Contracts, filings, clinical records, audit packages. The retention period is longer than the lifetime of any single signature algorithm on the standards timeline.

A signature algorithm on a deprecation clock

RSA and ECDSA signatures have a date on them now. Everything signed with them has to be re-anchored before that date, or explained to an auditor after it.

An auditor asks for proof of when, not only who

A signature proves identity. It does not prove the moment. Without an independent timestamp, the moment of signing is an assertion, not evidence.

Who signs this: A head of legal operations or a compliance officer who owns records with a long retention, and a CISO who owns the algorithms those records depend on. If the answer to “will this still verify in ten years?” is “probably”, this is the conversation.

Why existing approaches fall short

A signature proves who signed. Nothing keeps it proving that on its own.

A signature is made in a second and relied on for years. Over those years the algorithm can lose its approval for signing, the key can be rotated, retired, compromised or destroyed, and the application that signed can be rewritten or switched off. The approaches most organizations use today handle the moment of signing. They leave the years after it to whoever is still around.

  • Where the algorithm is chosen

    Signing inside each application
    In each application’s code and libraries
    Certificates and PKI alone
    In the certificate profile each application requests
    Re-sign later, when it becomes urgent
    Wherever it was chosen the first time
    Sign and verify under central policy
    In policy, enforced where the signature is made
  • When the algorithm loses its approval for signing

    Signing inside each application
    Each application changes and ships
    Certificates and PKI alone
    New certificates, and each application changes to use them
    Re-sign later, when it becomes urgent
    A project starts, often close to the deadline
    Sign and verify under central policy
    New signing is refused centrally; verification of what exists continues
  • Proof of when, not only who

    Signing inside each application
    A local clock, if anything
    Certificates and PKI alone
    Only if each application calls a timestamping authority
    Re-sign later, when it becomes urgent
    Not addressed
    Sign and verify under central policy
    An RFC 3161 timestamp, required per tenant by policy, embedded in the signature
  • Moving existing signatures to a new algorithm

    Signing inside each application
    Only where the application still holds the key and the logic
    Certificates and PKI alone
    Out of scope: a certificate does not re-sign anything
    Re-sign later, when it becomes urgent
    Possible only while the old signature still verifies and someone owns the job
    Sign and verify under central policy
    Re-signing under a new key, after every existing signature is verified
  • What an auditor can see

    Signing inside each application
    Application logs, if they were kept
    Certificates and PKI alone
    Certificate issuance records
    Re-sign later, when it becomes urgent
    A project report
    Sign and verify under central policy
    Each signature, verification and re-signature in a signed, hash-chained audit trail

The contract that outlives its algorithm

A supply contract is signed in 2026 with ECDSA and must be kept for ten years, until 2036. NIST IR 8547 deprecates ECDSA after 2030 and disallows it under NIST standards after 2035. The plan is to re-sign the archive later. In 2034 the application that signed has been replaced, the team that owned its key has moved on, and nobody has decided who may re-sign what. Re-signing only helps while the old signature still verifies and its key has not been compromised or destroyed. A plan to re-sign later is a decision to rely on all of that still being true.

Every framework separates making a signature from proving one.

  • NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 2

    Issued by
    NIST, March 2019
    What it says about signatures over time
    RSA keys of 1024 to 1792 bits may still be used to verify signatures but not to generate them. Legacy use means processing information that is already protected, such as verifying a signature.
  • NIST IR 8547

    Issued by
    NIST, final, October 2026
    What it says about signatures over time
    ECDSA, EdDSA and RSA signatures are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed under NIST standards after 2035. Signatures face no harvest-now threat, but the transition is urgent because it is longer, more complex and involves more parties.
  • ETSI EN 319 102-1 V1.4.1

    Issued by
    ETSI, June 2024
    What it says about signatures over time
    Before the algorithms of a signature become weak, or the certificates behind earlier time-assertions expire, new time-assertions should be applied, with stronger algorithms, and repeated over time.
  • Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, Article 34

    Issued by
    European Union, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1183
    What it says about signatures over time
    A qualified preservation service for qualified electronic signatures may only be provided by a qualified trust service provider able to extend their trustworthiness beyond the technological validity period.
  • Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1946

    Issued by
    European Commission, 29 September 2025
    What it says about signatures over time
    Sets ETSI TS 119 511, with adaptations, as the reference standard for qualified preservation services for qualified electronic signatures and seals.

How it works

Four moves, none of them a rewrite

The application asks for a signature with a key it names. Policy governs which algorithms that key may use and whether a timestamp is required, and the response states the algorithm used.

  1. Sign under policy

    The algorithm is the one of the key the application names, and the tenant’s policy governs which algorithms keys may be created and rotated with: ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, FALCON, the classical families, or a composite signature that pairs a classical and a post-quantum component and requires both to verify. Changing the algorithm is a rotation under policy, not a release.

    • ML-DSA
    • SLH-DSA
    • composite signatures
    • policy-governed
  2. Timestamp against the authority you trust

    Any RFC 3161 timestamping authority — commercial, national or your own. Whether a timestamp is required, optional or disabled is a policy per tenant under a deployment ceiling, so a regulated tenant cannot sign without one.

    • RFC 3161
    • REQUIRED / OPTIONAL / DISABLED
    • per-tenant policy
  3. Carry the timestamp in the signature

    The timestamp token is embedded in the signature itself as a JAdES signature timestamp (sigTst, ETSI TS 119 182-1), in JWS JSON Serialization, so the proof of when travels with the proof of who. Verification checks both and reports the two verdicts side by side.

    • JAdES signature timestamp
    • ETSI TS 119 182-1
    • JWS JSON
  4. Re-sign when the algorithm ages

    When policy retires an algorithm, ANKASecure© verifies every existing signature on the document and re-signs it under a key with the new algorithm — the RESIGN operation — and the signed audit trail records the source and destination keys and material versions of each re-signature.

    • RESIGN
    • signed audit trail
    • hash chain

Long-term evidence done right

Preserve the evidence or replace the signature. Know which one you are doing.

There are two answers to an aging signature. The European preservation model keeps the original and adds evidence over it: timestamps, validation material and, later, archive timestamps under stronger algorithms. Re-signing produces a new signature under a new key, after checking the old one. Both are legitimate, and they mean different things to a court and to an auditor. ANKASecure© does the first step of one and the whole of the other, and keeps them distinct.

A timestamp over the signature, not instead of it

The RFC 3161 token is computed over the signature value and carried as a JAdES signature timestamp in the unprotected header. The original signature is never recomputed, and the token can be checked by any RFC 3161-aware verifier without ANKASecure©.

Re-signing verifies first and replaces one signer

Every signature on the document is verified under its own key before anything is signed. One invalid signature refuses the whole request, so a re-signature never launders a bad co-signature. Every other signature, its timestamp included, is returned exactly as received.

Deprecation and compromise are different events

A key revoked because its algorithm is deprecated keeps verifying and can still be the source of a re-signature. A key revoked for compromise is sealed: verification and re-signing from it are refused on every plane, stricter than NIST SP 800-57 requires.

Verification never depends on today’s signing policy

A security-strength floor refuses signing with weaker keys and leaves verification and re-signing from them admitted at any strength, the legacy use SP 800-131A describes. Timestamp verification is never gated by the timestamping policy, so switching stamping off breaks no stamp already issued.

A re-signature is an attestation by the platform, under a new key, that the earlier signature verified when it was replaced. It is not a new act by the original signer. Where qualified preservation is required, these signatures and timestamps are the input to a qualified preservation provider, not a substitute for one.

Two clocks on every signature

A signature must verify for longer than its algorithm is allowed to sign.

Every signature runs on two clocks. One is the retention period of the record it protects, set by contracts and regulation. The other is the time its algorithm and key remain acceptable for making new signatures, set by standards bodies and by events. The first is usually longer. Long-term evidence is the work of covering the difference: keeping verification available after signing has stopped, and moving the signature before verification itself becomes impossible.

  • The signing key is rotated

    What it does to existing signatures
    Nothing, if the old material is still available to verify them.
    What keeps them provable on ANKASecure©
    Each signature names its material version, and retired material keeps verifying while new signing uses the new version.
  • The algorithm is deprecated

    What it does to existing signatures
    They remain valid, but the risk accepted grows each year.
    What keeps them provable on ANKASecure©
    The key is revoked as ALGORITHM_DEPRECATED: new signing stops, verification continues, and its signatures can be re-signed under a policy-approved key.
  • A strength floor is raised

    What it does to existing signatures
    Keys below the floor should no longer sign.
    What keeps them provable on ANKASecure©
    Signing with them is refused; verifying and re-signing from them stay admitted at any strength.
  • The signing key is compromised

    What it does to existing signatures
    No signature from that key can be trusted on its own any longer.
    What keeps them provable on ANKASecure©
    Verification and re-signing from the key are refused. A timestamp obtained earlier still proves when the signature value existed, so re-sign before an algorithm ages rather than after an incident.
  • The signing key is destroyed

    What it does to existing signatures
    They can no longer be verified on the platform.
    What keeps them provable on ANKASecure©
    Destruction follows a cooling-off period and is the one status that ends verification, so it is scheduled after the longest retention the key serves.

The hardest row is compromise, because it allows no exit after the fact. A key compromised before its signatures were moved takes them with it, and a timestamp then proves when a signature existed, not that its key was still sound. That is why the useful time to re-sign is while the algorithm is merely deprecated, and why the policy that refuses new signatures and the policy that keeps old ones verifiable must be separate.

Post-quantum migration →Legacy cryptography modernization →

Fifteen minutes

What you will actually watch

Live, on a real deployment, against a timestamping authority you name. Nothing in this list is a mock-up or a roadmap item.

  1. A document is signed. The application named its key; the key is ML-DSA, an algorithm the policy allows.

  2. The signature is timestamped against your RFC 3161 authority. The token is inside the signature, as a JAdES signature timestamp.

  3. Verification: signature and timestamp, both checked, two verdicts side by side.

  4. The policy tightens to composite signatures. The document is re-signed under a composite key after its existing signature verifies, and the audit trail links the source key to the destination key.

  5. The audit trail: sign and re-sign, signed and tamper-evident, each with its key, algorithm and outcome.

  6. Your record, checked on the deployment rather than on a slide.

Generation is not verification

The deadlines apply to making signatures. The obligations apply to keeping them.

NIST’s transition dates for quantum-vulnerable signatures govern which algorithms may generate new signatures. Retention rules and preservation regulation govern how long existing ones must remain provable. An organization answers to both, and the second usually outlasts the first.

  • NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 2

    What it requires over time
    A status per operation: an algorithm or key length can be disallowed for generation and still allowed for verification as legacy use.
    What ANKASecure© contributes
    Signing and verification are judged separately, by the strength floor and by the key lifecycle policy.
  • NIST IR 8547 (final, October 2026)

    What it requires over time
    Quantum-vulnerable signatures deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Dual signatures are accommodated when at least one component is NIST-approved, and verification requires every component.
    What ANKASecure© contributes
    ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and composite signatures pairing ML-DSA with a classical algorithm, valid only when both components verify.
  • ETSI EN 319 102-1 V1.4.1 (2024)

    What it requires over time
    Timestamps created before the signing certificate is revoked or expires, and time-assertions renewed with stronger algorithms before the old ones weaken.
    What ANKASecure© contributes
    A signature timestamp at signing, required per tenant, refused rather than skipped when the authority cannot issue one.
  • Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as amended by 2024/1183

    What it requires over time
    A qualified electronic time stamp is presumed accurate in date and time. Preservation of qualified signatures beyond their technological validity is a qualified trust service.
    What ANKASecure© contributes
    A client of the qualified timestamping authority you choose. Not a qualified trust service provider and not a preservation service.
  • Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1946

    What it requires over time
    Qualified preservation services follow ETSI TS 119 511: the ability to validate a signature is preserved even if the signing key is later compromised or its algorithm attacked.
    What ANKASecure© contributes
    Signed, hash-chained evidence of each signature, verification and re-signature, which a preservation provider or auditor can rely on.

Timing is the control

ETSI notes that a timestamp must exist before the certificate is revoked or expires. A required timestamping policy fails closed, so no signature is issued without one while the policy says it must carry one.

Hybrid, the way NIST describes it

A composite signature produces one value from an ML-DSA and a classical component and is valid only when both verify. A signature that one component alone would accept is not valid.

Verification outlasts signing

When 2035 arrives for RSA and elliptic-curve signatures, the operational question is not whether they can still verify. It is whether every signature that must remain provable has been re-signed, and whether that can be shown.

What it rests on

The capabilities underneath, with their state

  • Shipping

    Signing and verification under policy

    Classical, post-quantum (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, FALCON) and composite signature pairings, compact and streaming.

  • Shipping

    RFC 3161 timestamping

    Any timestamping authority, exercised live; per-tenant usage policy — required, optional or disabled — under a deployment ceiling.

  • Shipping

    JAdES signature timestamp

    The timestamp token embedded in the signature as a JAdES signature timestamp (sigTst, ETSI TS 119 182-1) in JWS JSON Serialization, and JAdES-aware verification.

  • Shipping

    Re-signing without plaintext exposure

    RESIGN migrates an existing signature to a policy-approved algorithm, compact or streaming.

  • Shipping

    Signed audit trail

    Every sign and re-sign recorded in a tamper-evident chain, each re-signature with its source and destination keys, queryable per tenant, forwardable to your SIEM with the signature preserved.

  • Shipping

    120+ algorithms

    The signature families this page names, alongside the encryption families, in one catalogue governed by one policy.

All of the platform →

The framework

Where this sits in CAPA

The Cryptographic Control Plane reference architecture describes each pillar through the scenarios it must handle and one practical test. A signature that must outlive its algorithm is the modernization pillar’s long-lived-key scenario, applied to evidence.

03

Primary pillar

Frictionless Modernization

Scenario realised

Correcting long-lived key dependencies

Practical test

“Can the protection of data encrypted years ago be changed today, without the originating application and without plaintext at rest?”

04

Primary pillar

Cryptographic Governance & Compliance

Scenario realised

Enforcing a new enterprise security requirement

Practical test

“Can the organization prove, by querying the control plane, which policy applied to a given operation, and change that policy centrally?”

01

Supporting pillar

Crypto-Agility

Scenario realised

Responding to an algorithm vulnerability

Practical test

“Can the cryptographic strategy change without requiring an application change or release?”

L2L4

Maturity move

From signatures whose algorithm is a property of the application to signatures whose algorithm is a policy, timestamped, and re-anchored by policy when it ages. That re-anchoring without a release is what the reference architecture calls cryptographic agility.

The six maturity levels →Reference architecture: cryptographiccontrolplane.org

What this does not do

  • It does not make ANKATech a qualified trust service provider. A timestamp is as legally qualified as the timestamping authority you choose; ANKASecure© governs and evidences, it does not accredit.

  • It does not archive your documents. The signature, the timestamp and the chain are evidence about the record; the record itself stays in your system of record.

  • It does not certify you. ANKASecure© maps its controls to NIST CSWP 39, the GSA PQC Buyer’s Guide and OWASP and hands you the evidence; the determination is still your auditor’s.

Where to start

Start with the records that must verify longest

The signatures that matter most are not the newest. They are the ones whose retention outlasts their algorithm, signed by applications that may not exist when the question is asked.

  1. 1

    Retention against algorithm

    Your teams list the signed records whose retention runs past 2030, with the algorithm and key that signed them. That list, not the total volume of signatures, sets the scope.

  2. 2

    Evidence-grade signing policy

    New signatures for those records are made under keys the policy allows past 2035, post-quantum or composite, with a timestamp required for the tenant.

  3. 3

    Re-signing the long tail

    Existing JWS signatures are re-signed under the new keys after verification. PKCS#7 archives are converted to JOSE first, with the same keys, and then re-signed.

Six questions for the CISO and the records owner

  1. Which signed records must remain provable after 2030, and which algorithm signed each of them?
  2. Can you stop new signatures under an algorithm without stopping verification of the signatures it already made?
  3. If a signing key were compromised tomorrow, which of its signatures would you still need, and could you prove they existed before the compromise?
  4. Do your signatures carry an independent timestamp, or only the clock of the system that signed?
  5. When a key reaches the end of its life, who checks that no record still depends on it before it is destroyed?
  6. Can you show an auditor which signatures were re-signed, from which key to which, and when?

Bring the record that must still verify in 2036.

A contract, a filing, a clinical record. Fifteen minutes on a live deployment to sign it, timestamp it against your authority and re-sign it under a stricter policy.

Book the demo