Records that must verify for a decade
Contracts, filings, clinical records, audit packages. The retention period is longer than the lifetime of any single signature algorithm on the standards timeline.
ANKASecure© produces digital signatures with keys whose algorithms the tenant’s policy governs — classical, post-quantum (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, FALCON) or composite signatures requiring both components to verify — and timestamps them against any RFC 3161 authority under a per-tenant usage policy (required, optional or disabled) beneath a deployment ceiling. The timestamp token is embedded in the signature as a JAdES signature timestamp (ETSI TS 119 182-1) in JWS JSON Serialization, and verification checks signature and timestamp, reporting the two verdicts side by side. When policy retires an algorithm, the RESIGN operation verifies the existing signatures and re-signs under a key with the new algorithm, and the signed, tamper-evident audit trail records the source and destination keys of each re-signature. ANKATech is not a qualified trust service provider, and the platform evidences records without archiving them.
A contract signed today has to verify in 2036, and the algorithm that signed it may not be acceptable by then. ANKASecure© signs with keys whose algorithms the policy governs — classical, post-quantum or both — timestamps the signature against the authority you trust, and re-signs it under a new key when the policy says the algorithm has aged. Every signature and re-signature is in the signed audit trail.
Is this you
Contracts, filings, clinical records, audit packages. The retention period is longer than the lifetime of any single signature algorithm on the standards timeline.
RSA and ECDSA signatures have a date on them now. Everything signed with them has to be re-anchored before that date, or explained to an auditor after it.
A signature proves identity. It does not prove the moment. Without an independent timestamp, the moment of signing is an assertion, not evidence.
Who signs this: A head of legal operations or a compliance officer who owns records with a long retention, and a CISO who owns the algorithms those records depend on. If the answer to “will this still verify in ten years?” is “probably”, this is the conversation.
Why existing approaches fall short
A signature is made in a second and relied on for years. Over those years the algorithm can lose its approval for signing, the key can be rotated, retired, compromised or destroyed, and the application that signed can be rewritten or switched off. The approaches most organizations use today handle the moment of signing. They leave the years after it to whoever is still around.
Where the algorithm is chosen
When the algorithm loses its approval for signing
Proof of when, not only who
Moving existing signatures to a new algorithm
What an auditor can see
A supply contract is signed in 2026 with ECDSA and must be kept for ten years, until 2036. NIST IR 8547 deprecates ECDSA after 2030 and disallows it under NIST standards after 2035. The plan is to re-sign the archive later. In 2034 the application that signed has been replaced, the team that owned its key has moved on, and nobody has decided who may re-sign what. Re-signing only helps while the old signature still verifies and its key has not been compromised or destroyed. A plan to re-sign later is a decision to rely on all of that still being true.
Every framework separates making a signature from proving one.
NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 2
NIST IR 8547
ETSI EN 319 102-1 V1.4.1
Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, Article 34
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1946
How it works
The application asks for a signature with a key it names. Policy governs which algorithms that key may use and whether a timestamp is required, and the response states the algorithm used.
The algorithm is the one of the key the application names, and the tenant’s policy governs which algorithms keys may be created and rotated with: ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, FALCON, the classical families, or a composite signature that pairs a classical and a post-quantum component and requires both to verify. Changing the algorithm is a rotation under policy, not a release.
Any RFC 3161 timestamping authority — commercial, national or your own. Whether a timestamp is required, optional or disabled is a policy per tenant under a deployment ceiling, so a regulated tenant cannot sign without one.
The timestamp token is embedded in the signature itself as a JAdES signature timestamp (sigTst, ETSI TS 119 182-1), in JWS JSON Serialization, so the proof of when travels with the proof of who. Verification checks both and reports the two verdicts side by side.
When policy retires an algorithm, ANKASecure© verifies every existing signature on the document and re-signs it under a key with the new algorithm — the RESIGN operation — and the signed audit trail records the source and destination keys and material versions of each re-signature.
Long-term evidence done right
There are two answers to an aging signature. The European preservation model keeps the original and adds evidence over it: timestamps, validation material and, later, archive timestamps under stronger algorithms. Re-signing produces a new signature under a new key, after checking the old one. Both are legitimate, and they mean different things to a court and to an auditor. ANKASecure© does the first step of one and the whole of the other, and keeps them distinct.
The RFC 3161 token is computed over the signature value and carried as a JAdES signature timestamp in the unprotected header. The original signature is never recomputed, and the token can be checked by any RFC 3161-aware verifier without ANKASecure©.
Every signature on the document is verified under its own key before anything is signed. One invalid signature refuses the whole request, so a re-signature never launders a bad co-signature. Every other signature, its timestamp included, is returned exactly as received.
A key revoked because its algorithm is deprecated keeps verifying and can still be the source of a re-signature. A key revoked for compromise is sealed: verification and re-signing from it are refused on every plane, stricter than NIST SP 800-57 requires.
A security-strength floor refuses signing with weaker keys and leaves verification and re-signing from them admitted at any strength, the legacy use SP 800-131A describes. Timestamp verification is never gated by the timestamping policy, so switching stamping off breaks no stamp already issued.
A re-signature is an attestation by the platform, under a new key, that the earlier signature verified when it was replaced. It is not a new act by the original signer. Where qualified preservation is required, these signatures and timestamps are the input to a qualified preservation provider, not a substitute for one.
Two clocks on every signature
Every signature runs on two clocks. One is the retention period of the record it protects, set by contracts and regulation. The other is the time its algorithm and key remain acceptable for making new signatures, set by standards bodies and by events. The first is usually longer. Long-term evidence is the work of covering the difference: keeping verification available after signing has stopped, and moving the signature before verification itself becomes impossible.
The signing key is rotated
The algorithm is deprecated
A strength floor is raised
The signing key is compromised
The signing key is destroyed
The hardest row is compromise, because it allows no exit after the fact. A key compromised before its signatures were moved takes them with it, and a timestamp then proves when a signature existed, not that its key was still sound. That is why the useful time to re-sign is while the algorithm is merely deprecated, and why the policy that refuses new signatures and the policy that keeps old ones verifiable must be separate.
Fifteen minutes
Live, on a real deployment, against a timestamping authority you name. Nothing in this list is a mock-up or a roadmap item.
A document is signed. The application named its key; the key is ML-DSA, an algorithm the policy allows.
The signature is timestamped against your RFC 3161 authority. The token is inside the signature, as a JAdES signature timestamp.
Verification: signature and timestamp, both checked, two verdicts side by side.
The policy tightens to composite signatures. The document is re-signed under a composite key after its existing signature verifies, and the audit trail links the source key to the destination key.
The audit trail: sign and re-sign, signed and tamper-evident, each with its key, algorithm and outcome.
Your record, checked on the deployment rather than on a slide.
Generation is not verification
NIST’s transition dates for quantum-vulnerable signatures govern which algorithms may generate new signatures. Retention rules and preservation regulation govern how long existing ones must remain provable. An organization answers to both, and the second usually outlasts the first.
NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 2
NIST IR 8547 (final, October 2026)
ETSI EN 319 102-1 V1.4.1 (2024)
Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as amended by 2024/1183
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1946
ETSI notes that a timestamp must exist before the certificate is revoked or expires. A required timestamping policy fails closed, so no signature is issued without one while the policy says it must carry one.
A composite signature produces one value from an ML-DSA and a classical component and is valid only when both verify. A signature that one component alone would accept is not valid.
When 2035 arrives for RSA and elliptic-curve signatures, the operational question is not whether they can still verify. It is whether every signature that must remain provable has been re-signed, and whether that can be shown.
What it rests on
Shipping
Signing and verification under policy
Classical, post-quantum (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, FALCON) and composite signature pairings, compact and streaming.
Shipping
RFC 3161 timestamping
Any timestamping authority, exercised live; per-tenant usage policy — required, optional or disabled — under a deployment ceiling.
Shipping
JAdES signature timestamp
The timestamp token embedded in the signature as a JAdES signature timestamp (sigTst, ETSI TS 119 182-1) in JWS JSON Serialization, and JAdES-aware verification.
Shipping
Re-signing without plaintext exposure
RESIGN migrates an existing signature to a policy-approved algorithm, compact or streaming.
Shipping
Signed audit trail
Every sign and re-sign recorded in a tamper-evident chain, each re-signature with its source and destination keys, queryable per tenant, forwardable to your SIEM with the signature preserved.
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120+ algorithms
The signature families this page names, alongside the encryption families, in one catalogue governed by one policy.
The framework
The Cryptographic Control Plane reference architecture describes each pillar through the scenarios it must handle and one practical test. A signature that must outlive its algorithm is the modernization pillar’s long-lived-key scenario, applied to evidence.
03
Primary pillar
Scenario realised
Correcting long-lived key dependencies
Practical test
“Can the protection of data encrypted years ago be changed today, without the originating application and without plaintext at rest?”
04
Primary pillar
Scenario realised
Enforcing a new enterprise security requirement
Practical test
“Can the organization prove, by querying the control plane, which policy applied to a given operation, and change that policy centrally?”
01
Supporting pillar
Scenario realised
Responding to an algorithm vulnerability
Practical test
“Can the cryptographic strategy change without requiring an application change or release?”
Maturity move
From signatures whose algorithm is a property of the application to signatures whose algorithm is a policy, timestamped, and re-anchored by policy when it ages. That re-anchoring without a release is what the reference architecture calls cryptographic agility.
It does not make ANKATech a qualified trust service provider. A timestamp is as legally qualified as the timestamping authority you choose; ANKASecure© governs and evidences, it does not accredit.
It does not archive your documents. The signature, the timestamp and the chain are evidence about the record; the record itself stays in your system of record.
It does not certify you. ANKASecure© maps its controls to NIST CSWP 39, the GSA PQC Buyer’s Guide and OWASP and hands you the evidence; the determination is still your auditor’s.
Where to start
The signatures that matter most are not the newest. They are the ones whose retention outlasts their algorithm, signed by applications that may not exist when the question is asked.
1
Your teams list the signed records whose retention runs past 2030, with the algorithm and key that signed them. That list, not the total volume of signatures, sets the scope.
2
New signatures for those records are made under keys the policy allows past 2035, post-quantum or composite, with a timestamp required for the tenant.
3
Existing JWS signatures are re-signed under the new keys after verification. PKCS#7 archives are converted to JOSE first, with the same keys, and then re-signed.
After this
No new deployment, no second contract for the platform. The policy that governs signatures governs encryption, and the chain that evidences one evidences both.
A contract, a filing, a clinical record. Fifteen minutes on a live deployment to sign it, timestamp it against your authority and re-sign it under a stricter policy.
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