A clause says the keys stay
A regulator, a board policy or a customer contract requires that key material never leave your HSM or your jurisdiction. Any platform that needs to hold the Root of Trust is disqualified before the evaluation starts.
ANKASecure© lets each tenant choose the Root of Trust that wraps its keys, through a three-rung precedence resolved per tenant: the tenant’s own backend, the managed backend its licensed edition assigns, or the deployment default. A tenant can bring its own cloud KMS key — AWS KMS, including a key store over its own CloudHSM cluster, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault or Azure Managed HSM — in its own account under its own credential; ANKASecure© exercises a live round trip before accepting the declaration, and the key-encryption key that wraps the tenant’s data keys never leaves that backend. A customer’s own HSM is the deployment backend of a private-cloud or on-premise installation; in SaaS, the default is a backend ANKATech manages per edition. Custody is independent of the deployment model — SaaS, private cloud or on-premise including air-gapped — and when the backend is in the customer’s account, every wrap and unwrap appears both in ANKASecure©’s signed audit trail and in the provider’s own log. The reference architecture makes distributed Roots of Trust a conformance requirement.
Every vendor says your keys stay yours. ANKASecure© makes it a setting you can read: each tenant resolves to the backend that wraps its keys — its own cloud KMS account under its own credential, or your own HSM when you run the platform in your private cloud or on-premise — and the key-encryption key never leaves that backend. When the backend is in your account, the proof is in your provider’s own log, not in a slide.
Is this you
A regulator, a board policy or a customer contract requires that key material never leave your HSM or your jurisdiction. Any platform that needs to hold the Root of Trust is disqualified before the evaluation starts.
The workloads can move. The keys cannot, or must move into an account the company controls. The migration waits on an answer to who wraps what, and where.
One entity keeps an HSM on premises, another is cloud-only, a third is in a jurisdiction with its own list. One platform has to hold all three without making them share a failure domain.
Who signs this: A CISO or head of cryptography who owns the custody requirement, and a head of infrastructure who owns the HSM or the cloud account it names. If a vendor evaluation stopped at “where does the Root of Trust live?”, this is the conversation.
Why existing approaches fall short
Key custody is two questions, and most answers stop at the first. Where does the key-encryption key live? And who holds the credential that can make it unwrap a data key? Provider-managed keys, customer-managed keys in the provider’s KMS and keys held outside the provider all answer the first question differently. None of them, on its own, answers the second, and none answers a third question a transfer assessment asks: where the data is processed in the clear.
Where the key-encryption key lives
Who can make it unwrap
Granularity
What changing it costs
Where data is processed in the clear
A European company moves a workload to a cloud region and keeps a key of its own in the provider’s KMS, in its own account. The contract clause says the keys stay under the company’s control, and on paper they do. The transfer assessment asks a different question: does the service that processes the data need it in the clear? It does, so the European Data Protection Board’s guidance applies: when the processor needs data in the clear, encryption at rest is not an effective supplementary measure, whoever holds the key. The clause was about the key. The risk was about the processing.
One key per tenant on every rung. What changes is whose credential opens it.
Tenant’s own backend
Managed backend of the edition
Deployment default
How it works
The tenant chooses the Root of Trust. ANKASecure© wraps under it, and the key-encryption key never leaves it.
Three rungs, resolved per tenant and stopping at the first one declared: the tenant’s own backend, the managed backend its licensed edition assigns, or the deployment default. A subsidiary that brings its own cloud KMS key and one that does not live in the same installation.
Declare your cloud KMS key, in your account, under your credential: AWS KMS, including a key store over your own CloudHSM cluster, Google Cloud KMS, Azure Key Vault or Azure Managed HSM. ANKASecure© runs a live round trip against it before accepting the declaration. From then on the key-encryption key that wraps the tenant’s data keys lives there and only there.
SaaS operated by ANKATech, your private cloud, or on-premise — including air-gapped. Custody and deployment are separate decisions: a SaaS tenant on an edition that includes it can wrap under its own KMS account, and an on-premise installation can still serve a tenant that brings a cloud key. In SaaS, a tenant that brings no key of its own is wrapped in a backend ANKATech manages for its edition; in your private cloud or on-premise, the default is your own HSM or KMS. The Trust page sets out, model by model, who holds the Root of Trust and what ANKATech can see.
When the backend is in your account or your data centre, every wrap and unwrap of a data key is a call to it, so it appears in your provider’s own audit log — CloudTrail, Cloud Audit Logs, Azure Monitor, or your HSM’s log in a deployment you operate — alongside ANKASecure©’s signed trail. Two records, two owners, one story.
Custody done right
Sovereignty claims usually stop at the location of the key. A custody model that survives a security review also states who can call it, what happens when the call fails, and who can take the key away. ANKASecure© answers each of these in the product, not in the contract.
No deployment model and no edition shares a key-encryption key between tenants. The wrapping binds the tenant identifier as authenticated data, and the backend is resolved from the verified tenant, never from a value the caller supplies.
A tenant’s own KMS is reached with the tenant’s own cloud identity, never ANKATech’s. The credential is sealed when it is declared and never returned on a read, and the backend is bound only after a wrap and unwrap round trip under the declared key succeeds.
With no backend bound, key operations receive a typed refusal instead of an unprotected path. A managed tenant whose own key cannot be located is refused rather than served by the shared one, and a key the provider reports as disabled or forbidden is a refusal, not a retry against something else.
A tenant’s own KMS is declared, changed and left on the tenant plane; the platform plane can read it, not write it. ANKASecure© never deletes, disables or schedules the deletion of a tenant’s own key. In SaaS, ANKATech enters a tenant only through a support grant the tenant issues, revocable and limited to 24 hours.
Custody of the key-encryption key is necessary and not sufficient. An encryption service has to see the data it encrypts, so where the service runs decides who processes data in the clear. That is why ANKASecure© keeps custody and deployment as separate decisions: the tenant chooses where its root of trust lives, and the organization chooses whether the platform runs as SaaS, in its own cloud account or in its own data centre. A physical HSM of a tenant’s own is reached through an AWS KMS key store over the tenant’s CloudHSM cluster, or, on a self-operated deployment, as the deployment backend every tenant inherits.
The custody lifetime
A key-encryption key serves for years. NIST SP 800-57 suggests an originator-usage period of up to two years for a key-wrapping key that wraps a small number of keys, and its wrapped keys may need to be unwrapped for up to three years after that. Within that span, editions change, providers change, keys are compromised and contracts end. A custody model that can only be set at creation turns each of those events into a tenant rebuild.
Rotation
Compromise
Change of backend
Rollback
Destruction
Exit
The custody lifetime is not set by the provider you choose on the first day. It is set by whether every later change of custody is an operation or a migration project. Two organizations with the same KMS face very different exposure if one can rotate, re-key and leave in a governed move, and the other has to rebuild tenants to do the same.
Fifteen minutes
Live, on a real deployment, against a backend in an account you control. Nothing in this list is a mock-up or a roadmap item.
A tenant on the managed backend. Its keys, and the backend that wraps them, on screen.
The tenant declares its own KMS key in its own account. The live round trip runs; the declaration is accepted.
A key is created under it. The wrap call appears in the cloud provider’s audit log, in your account, seconds later.
A second tenant, on a different backend, in the same installation. Neither can reach the other’s Root of Trust.
ANKASecure©’s signed trail next to the provider’s log: the same operations, recorded by two parties.
Your custody clause, checked on the deployment rather than on a slide.
Custody in the transfer analysis
In Schrems II (C-311/18, 16 July 2020) the Court of Justice upheld standard contractual clauses, held that they may require supplementary measures, and invalidated the EU-US Privacy Shield. The European Data Protection Board then set out when encryption is such a measure. The EU-US Data Privacy Framework has been in force since July 2023, but an adequacy basis can fall, as Privacy Shield did; a custody model that does not depend on one stays where it is.
GDPR, Art. 44 and 46
EDPB Recommendations 01/2020, Use Case 1
EDPB Recommendations 01/2020, Use Case 6
DORA RTS 2024/1774, Art. 7
DORA, Art. 28(8)
Holding the key does not change what a service in the clear can see. Custody answers the EDPB’s first use case; only the deployment model answers its sixth.
On a managed backend each tenant has its own key, but ANKATech holds the credential. Only a tenant on its own KMS, or on a deployment it operates itself, holds the sole credential.
When the backend is in your account, every wrap and unwrap is a call your provider records, beside ANKASecure©’s signed audit trail. Two records, kept by two parties.
What it rests on
Shipping
Three-rung backend precedence
Tenant BYOK, then the backend the licensed edition assigns, then the deployment default; resolved per tenant.
Shipping
Cloud KMS backends
AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault and Azure Managed HSM, each exercised in a live round trip against the real service.
Shipping
HSM backends
The deployment backend of a private-cloud or on-premise installation: AWS CloudHSM exercised live; PKCS#11 adapters for other HSMs ship with a published per-mechanism test state.
Shipping
Per-tenant keystores and key lifecycle
Envelope encryption: data keys wrapped by a per-tenant key-encryption key that never leaves the backend; a seven-state lifecycle per key.
Shipping
Three deployment models
SaaS, private cloud, on-premise including air-gapped — independent of the custody decision.
Shipping
Signed audit trail
Every wrap and unwrap recorded, tamper-evident, beside your provider’s own log when the backend is in your account.
The framework
The Cryptographic Control Plane reference architecture states this as a conformance requirement, not a preference: a platform that requires every key or Root of Trust to live in a single provider or cryptographic failure domain does not conform.
02
Primary pillar
Scenario realised
Retaining control of the Root of Trust
Practical test
“Can the organization govern policy across all its trust domains without moving keys, and revoke a third party’s cryptographic authority without re-encrypting the data?”
05
Primary pillar
Scenario realised
Integrating with the existing enterprise security ecosystem
Practical test
“Can the control plane be adopted without replacing the identity, KMS/HSM, PKI, or monitoring platforms already in place?”
04
Supporting pillar
Scenario realised
Applying policy across multiple jurisdictions
Practical test
“Can the organization prove, by querying the control plane, which policy applied to a given operation, and change that policy centrally?”
Maturity move
From a KMS the platform depends on to a Control Plane that governs keys wherever they are held. Custody is the property that makes level 3 acceptable to an organization that could not otherwise adopt one.
It does not operate your HSM or your cloud account. The backend, its credential and its availability stay yours; ANKASecure© calls it and records the call.
It does not move a tenant’s existing key material between backends on its own. Changing the Root of Trust is a governed operation with its own evidence, not a background migration.
It does not certify you. ANKASecure© maps its controls to NIST CSWP 39, the GSA PQC Buyer’s Guide and OWASP and hands you the evidence; the determination is still your auditor’s.
Where to start
Custody is easiest to settle before the first key is wrapped: until then a tenant changes its backend with a declaration, and after it, with a custody move. Settle the custody requirement and the deployment model together, because one decides who holds the key and the other decides who sees the data.
1
For each class of data, the rung it needs (own KMS, managed edition or deployment default) and the deployment model its clear-text processing allows.
2
ANKASecure© binding a key in a cloud account you control, the round trip in your provider’s log, and a second tenant on a different backend in the same installation.
3
One tenant on its own KMS for one critical use, including a key rotation and a custody move with its rollback.
After this
No new deployment, no second contract for the platform. Once the Root of Trust is where it must be, everything on top of it is policy.
The one that says the keys stay. Fifteen minutes on a live deployment to show it as a setting, against an account you control.
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