ANKASecure© lets each tenant choose the Root of Trust that wraps its keys, through a three-rung precedence resolved per tenant: the tenant’s own backend, the managed backend its licensed edition assigns, or the deployment default. A tenant can bring its own cloud KMS key — AWS KMS, including a key store over its own CloudHSM cluster, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault or Azure Managed HSM — in its own account under its own credential; ANKASecure© exercises a live round trip before accepting the declaration, and the key-encryption key that wraps the tenant’s data keys never leaves that backend. A customer’s own HSM is the deployment backend of a private-cloud or on-premise installation; in SaaS, the default is a backend ANKATech manages per edition. Custody is independent of the deployment model — SaaS, private cloud or on-premise including air-gapped — and when the backend is in the customer’s account, every wrap and unwrap appears both in ANKASecure©’s signed audit trail and in the provider’s own log. The reference architecture makes distributed Roots of Trust a conformance requirement.

Your keys never leave your HSM or KMS. That is a configuration, not a promise.

Every vendor says your keys stay yours. ANKASecure© makes it a setting you can read: each tenant resolves to the backend that wraps its keys — its own cloud KMS account under its own credential, or your own HSM when you run the platform in your private cloud or on-premise — and the key-encryption key never leaves that backend. When the backend is in your account, the proof is in your provider’s own log, not in a slide.

CISOHead of infrastructureHead of cryptography

Is this you

Three ways this lands on your desk

A clause says the keys stay

A regulator, a board policy or a customer contract requires that key material never leave your HSM or your jurisdiction. Any platform that needs to hold the Root of Trust is disqualified before the evaluation starts.

A cloud migration is blocked on custody

The workloads can move. The keys cannot, or must move into an account the company controls. The migration waits on an answer to who wraps what, and where.

Subsidiaries with different rules

One entity keeps an HSM on premises, another is cloud-only, a third is in a jurisdiction with its own list. One platform has to hold all three without making them share a failure domain.

Who signs this: A CISO or head of cryptography who owns the custody requirement, and a head of infrastructure who owns the HSM or the cloud account it names. If a vendor evaluation stopped at “where does the Root of Trust live?”, this is the conversation.

Why existing approaches fall short

Every vendor says the keys are yours. The question is who can make them unwrap.

Key custody is two questions, and most answers stop at the first. Where does the key-encryption key live? And who holds the credential that can make it unwrap a data key? Provider-managed keys, customer-managed keys in the provider’s KMS and keys held outside the provider all answer the first question differently. None of them, on its own, answers the second, and none answers a third question a transfer assessment asks: where the data is processed in the clear.

  • Where the key-encryption key lives

    Provider-managed keys
    In the provider’s KMS, under the provider’s administration
    Customer-managed key in the provider’s KMS
    In the provider’s KMS, in your account, sometimes from material you imported
    Key held outside the provider
    In your own HSM or key manager
    A root of trust per tenant
    In the backend each tenant resolves to: its own Cloud KMS account, the managed backend of its edition, or the deployment’s HSM or KMS
  • Who can make it unwrap

    Provider-managed keys
    The provider’s service
    Customer-managed key in the provider’s KMS
    The provider’s service, within the key policy you write
    Key held outside the provider
    The provider’s service, through a call to your key manager
    A root of trust per tenant
    For a tenant on its own KMS, only a call made with the tenant’s own credential, which is sealed and never returned
  • Granularity

    Provider-managed keys
    Per service or per account
    Customer-managed key in the provider’s KMS
    Per resource, decided team by team
    Key held outside the provider
    Per integration
    A root of trust per tenant
    One key-encryption key per tenant, resolved on every operation
  • What changing it costs

    Provider-managed keys
    Re-encryption, service by service
    Customer-managed key in the provider’s KMS
    Re-encryption, service by service
    Key held outside the provider
    A new integration per service
    A root of trust per tenant
    A custody move that re-wraps the tenant’s keys; the data they protect is not re-encrypted
  • Where data is processed in the clear

    Provider-managed keys
    Not answered by the key
    Customer-managed key in the provider’s KMS
    Not answered by the key
    Key held outside the provider
    Not answered by the key
    A root of trust per tenant
    Not answered by the key either: that is the deployment decision, kept separate

The clause that passed and the assessment that did not

A European company moves a workload to a cloud region and keeps a key of its own in the provider’s KMS, in its own account. The contract clause says the keys stay under the company’s control, and on paper they do. The transfer assessment asks a different question: does the service that processes the data need it in the clear? It does, so the European Data Protection Board’s guidance applies: when the processor needs data in the clear, encryption at rest is not an effective supplementary measure, whoever holds the key. The clause was about the key. The risk was about the processing.

One key per tenant on every rung. What changes is whose credential opens it.

  • Tenant’s own backend

    Where the key-encryption key lives
    The tenant’s own Cloud KMS: AWS KMS, including a key store over the tenant’s own AWS CloudHSM cluster, Google Cloud KMS, Azure Key Vault or Azure Managed HSM
    Who holds the credential
    The tenant
    Who chooses it
    The tenant, or the platform administrator where it is delegated on a self-operated deployment
  • Managed backend of the edition

    Where the key-encryption key lives
    A backend ANKATech operates per edition, with a key object of the tenant’s own on it
    Who holds the credential
    ANKATech
    Who chooses it
    The platform administrator, by assigning the edition
  • Deployment default

    Where the key-encryption key lives
    The deployment’s own HSM or Cloud KMS, with a key-encryption key per tenant
    Who holds the credential
    Whoever operates the deployment: ANKATech in SaaS, you in private cloud and on-premise
    Who chooses it
    The environment’s configuration

How it works

Four moves, none of them a migration of your keys

The tenant chooses the Root of Trust. ANKASecure© wraps under it, and the key-encryption key never leaves it.

  1. Choose the Root of Trust, per tenant

    Three rungs, resolved per tenant and stopping at the first one declared: the tenant’s own backend, the managed backend its licensed edition assigns, or the deployment default. A subsidiary that brings its own cloud KMS key and one that does not live in the same installation.

    • tenant BYOK
    • edition-assigned
    • deployment default
  2. Bring your own cloud KMS key

    Declare your cloud KMS key, in your account, under your credential: AWS KMS, including a key store over your own CloudHSM cluster, Google Cloud KMS, Azure Key Vault or Azure Managed HSM. ANKASecure© runs a live round trip against it before accepting the declaration. From then on the key-encryption key that wraps the tenant’s data keys lives there and only there.

    • AWS KMS
    • AWS CloudHSM key store
    • GCP KMS
    • Azure Key Vault
    • Azure Managed HSM
  3. Keep the deployment choice too

    SaaS operated by ANKATech, your private cloud, or on-premise — including air-gapped. Custody and deployment are separate decisions: a SaaS tenant on an edition that includes it can wrap under its own KMS account, and an on-premise installation can still serve a tenant that brings a cloud key. In SaaS, a tenant that brings no key of its own is wrapped in a backend ANKATech manages for its edition; in your private cloud or on-premise, the default is your own HSM or KMS. The Trust page sets out, model by model, who holds the Root of Trust and what ANKATech can see.

  4. Prove it from outside the platform

    When the backend is in your account or your data centre, every wrap and unwrap of a data key is a call to it, so it appears in your provider’s own audit log — CloudTrail, Cloud Audit Logs, Azure Monitor, or your HSM’s log in a deployment you operate — alongside ANKASecure©’s signed trail. Two records, two owners, one story.

    • signed audit trail
    • your provider’s log

Custody done right

Hold the key-encryption key. And hold the only credential that opens it.

Sovereignty claims usually stop at the location of the key. A custody model that survives a security review also states who can call it, what happens when the call fails, and who can take the key away. ANKASecure© answers each of these in the product, not in the contract.

One key-encryption key per tenant, on every rung

No deployment model and no edition shares a key-encryption key between tenants. The wrapping binds the tenant identifier as authenticated data, and the backend is resolved from the verified tenant, never from a value the caller supplies.

Your credential, proven and sealed

A tenant’s own KMS is reached with the tenant’s own cloud identity, never ANKATech’s. The credential is sealed when it is declared and never returned on a read, and the backend is bound only after a wrap and unwrap round trip under the declared key succeeds.

Fail closed, never fall back

With no backend bound, key operations receive a typed refusal instead of an unprotected path. A managed tenant whose own key cannot be located is refused rather than served by the shared one, and a key the provider reports as disabled or forbidden is a refusal, not a retry against something else.

The platform cannot take your key away

A tenant’s own KMS is declared, changed and left on the tenant plane; the platform plane can read it, not write it. ANKASecure© never deletes, disables or schedules the deletion of a tenant’s own key. In SaaS, ANKATech enters a tenant only through a support grant the tenant issues, revocable and limited to 24 hours.

Custody of the key-encryption key is necessary and not sufficient. An encryption service has to see the data it encrypts, so where the service runs decides who processes data in the clear. That is why ANKASecure© keeps custody and deployment as separate decisions: the tenant chooses where its root of trust lives, and the organization chooses whether the platform runs as SaaS, in its own cloud account or in its own data centre. A physical HSM of a tenant’s own is reached through an AWS KMS key store over the tenant’s CloudHSM cluster, or, on a self-operated deployment, as the deployment backend every tenant inherits.

The custody lifetime

The root of trust is chosen in a day. It has to be lived with for years.

A key-encryption key serves for years. NIST SP 800-57 suggests an originator-usage period of up to two years for a key-wrapping key that wraps a small number of keys, and its wrapped keys may need to be unwrapped for up to three years after that. Within that span, editions change, providers change, keys are compromised and contracts end. A custody model that can only be set at creation turns each of those events into a tenant rebuild.

  • Rotation

    Question it raises
    Is the wrapping key within its cryptoperiod?
    What usually makes it long
    Rotating it means re-wrapping everything under it, by hand.
    In ANKASecure©
    HSM-held keys rotate online on a period, 12 months by default; managed cloud keys get the provider’s native rotation enabled; a tenant’s own key rotates on its provider, and the platform reports what it observes.
  • Compromise

    Question it raises
    Can we re-key now?
    What usually makes it long
    No procedure exists until it is needed.
    In ANKASecure©
    A compromise re-key re-wraps the tenant’s keys under a new version while operations continue, and the retired key cannot be rolled back to.
  • Change of backend

    Question it raises
    Can a tenant move to another provider, account or HSM?
    What usually makes it long
    Custody is fixed when the tenant is created.
    In ANKASecure©
    A custody move: online for another key under the same provider and credential, in a scheduled maintenance window otherwise, with the tenant’s administrators notified.
  • Rollback

    Question it raises
    What if the destination misbehaves?
    What usually makes it long
    The old key is already gone, or never tracked.
    In ANKASecure©
    The key the tenant left is retained for 30 days, and a rollback runs through the same engine.
  • Destruction

    Question it raises
    Is the old key really gone?
    What usually makes it long
    It is deactivated in a database and stays enabled at the provider, so old backups remain decryptable.
    In ANKASecure©
    Destroyed at the provider or HSM on an explicit request that can require a quorum, only once nothing is wrapped under it, and recorded as destroyed only when the provider confirms it.
  • Exit

    Question it raises
    Can we leave this provider without leaving the platform?
    What usually makes it long
    Keys and platform are one contract.
    In ANKASecure©
    A tenant moves between its own KMS keys, or back to the backend it inherits, as another custody move.

The custody lifetime is not set by the provider you choose on the first day. It is set by whether every later change of custody is an operation or a migration project. Two organizations with the same KMS face very different exposure if one can rotate, re-key and leave in a governed move, and the other has to rebuild tenants to do the same.

Post-quantum migration →Governed third-party exchange →

Fifteen minutes

What you will actually watch

Live, on a real deployment, against a backend in an account you control. Nothing in this list is a mock-up or a roadmap item.

  1. A tenant on the managed backend. Its keys, and the backend that wraps them, on screen.

  2. The tenant declares its own KMS key in its own account. The live round trip runs; the declaration is accepted.

  3. A key is created under it. The wrap call appears in the cloud provider’s audit log, in your account, seconds later.

  4. A second tenant, on a different backend, in the same installation. Neither can reach the other’s Root of Trust.

  5. ANKASecure©’s signed trail next to the provider’s log: the same operations, recorded by two parties.

  6. Your custody clause, checked on the deployment rather than on a slide.

Custody in the transfer analysis

Encryption counts as a safeguard when the exporter keeps the keys

In Schrems II (C-311/18, 16 July 2020) the Court of Justice upheld standard contractual clauses, held that they may require supplementary measures, and invalidated the EU-US Privacy Shield. The European Data Protection Board then set out when encryption is such a measure. The EU-US Data Privacy Framework has been in force since July 2023, but an adequacy basis can fall, as Privacy Shield did; a custody model that does not depend on one stays where it is.

  • GDPR, Art. 44 and 46

    What it asks for
    Transfers to third countries only under the conditions of Chapter V; without an adequacy decision, appropriate safeguards with enforceable rights.
    Where ANKASecure© contributes
    Keeps the key-encryption key where the exporter decides. It does not, on its own, make a transfer lawful.
  • EDPB Recommendations 01/2020, Use Case 1

    What it asks for
    Encryption is effective when, among other conditions, the keys are retained solely under the control of the data exporter, or of an entity it trusts in the EEA or an equivalent jurisdiction.
    Where ANKASecure© contributes
    A tenant’s own Cloud KMS under its own credential, or, on a self-operated deployment, the organization’s own HSM or KMS.
  • EDPB Recommendations 01/2020, Use Case 6

    What it asks for
    When a processor needs the data in the clear, the EDPB cannot envisage an effective technical measure.
    Where ANKASecure© contributes
    Not answered by custody. Answered by the deployment: private cloud or on-premise puts clear-text processing inside your own perimeter.
  • DORA RTS 2024/1774, Art. 7

    What it asks for
    Key management through the whole lifecycle, including renewing, retiring, revoking and destroying, and methods to replace compromised keys.
    Where ANKASecure© contributes
    Rotation, compromise re-key, retirement and provider-confirmed destruction of each tenant’s key-encryption key.
  • DORA, Art. 28(8)

    What it asks for
    Exit strategies for ICT services supporting critical or important functions, without disruption to business or to compliance.
    Where ANKASecure© contributes
    Custody moves between backends with a rollback period, so leaving a key provider does not mean leaving the platform.

Necessary, not sufficient

Holding the key does not change what a service in the clear can see. Custody answers the EDPB’s first use case; only the deployment model answers its sixth.

“Solely” includes the credential

On a managed backend each tenant has its own key, but ANKATech holds the credential. Only a tenant on its own KMS, or on a deployment it operates itself, holds the sole credential.

Evidence on both sides

When the backend is in your account, every wrap and unwrap is a call your provider records, beside ANKASecure©’s signed audit trail. Two records, kept by two parties.

What it rests on

The capabilities underneath, with their state

  • Shipping

    Three-rung backend precedence

    Tenant BYOK, then the backend the licensed edition assigns, then the deployment default; resolved per tenant.

  • Shipping

    Cloud KMS backends

    AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault and Azure Managed HSM, each exercised in a live round trip against the real service.

  • Shipping

    HSM backends

    The deployment backend of a private-cloud or on-premise installation: AWS CloudHSM exercised live; PKCS#11 adapters for other HSMs ship with a published per-mechanism test state.

  • Shipping

    Per-tenant keystores and key lifecycle

    Envelope encryption: data keys wrapped by a per-tenant key-encryption key that never leaves the backend; a seven-state lifecycle per key.

  • Shipping

    Three deployment models

    SaaS, private cloud, on-premise including air-gapped — independent of the custody decision.

  • Shipping

    Signed audit trail

    Every wrap and unwrap recorded, tamper-evident, beside your provider’s own log when the backend is in your account.

All of the platform →

The framework

Where this sits in CAPA

The Cryptographic Control Plane reference architecture states this as a conformance requirement, not a preference: a platform that requires every key or Root of Trust to live in a single provider or cryptographic failure domain does not conform.

02

Primary pillar

Cryptographic Sovereignty

Scenario realised

Retaining control of the Root of Trust

Practical test

“Can the organization govern policy across all its trust domains without moving keys, and revoke a third party’s cryptographic authority without re-encrypting the data?”

05

Primary pillar

Enterprise Readiness

Scenario realised

Integrating with the existing enterprise security ecosystem

Practical test

“Can the control plane be adopted without replacing the identity, KMS/HSM, PKI, or monitoring platforms already in place?”

04

Supporting pillar

Cryptographic Governance & Compliance

Scenario realised

Applying policy across multiple jurisdictions

Practical test

“Can the organization prove, by querying the control plane, which policy applied to a given operation, and change that policy centrally?”

L2L3

Maturity move

From a KMS the platform depends on to a Control Plane that governs keys wherever they are held. Custody is the property that makes level 3 acceptable to an organization that could not otherwise adopt one.

The six maturity levels →Reference architecture: cryptographiccontrolplane.org

What this does not do

  • It does not operate your HSM or your cloud account. The backend, its credential and its availability stay yours; ANKASecure© calls it and records the call.

  • It does not move a tenant’s existing key material between backends on its own. Changing the Root of Trust is a governed operation with its own evidence, not a background migration.

  • It does not certify you. ANKASecure© maps its controls to NIST CSWP 39, the GSA PQC Buyer’s Guide and OWASP and hands you the evidence; the determination is still your auditor’s.

Where to start

Six questions before an auditor asks them

Custody is easiest to settle before the first key is wrapped: until then a tenant changes its backend with a declaration, and after it, with a custody move. Settle the custody requirement and the deployment model together, because one decides who holds the key and the other decides who sees the data.

  1. 1

    Custody requirement mapped

    For each class of data, the rung it needs (own KMS, managed edition or deployment default) and the deployment model its clear-text processing allows.

  2. 2

    Demonstration against your account

    ANKASecure© binding a key in a cloud account you control, the round trip in your provider’s log, and a second tenant on a different backend in the same installation.

  3. 3

    Scoped pilot

    One tenant on its own KMS for one critical use, including a key rotation and a custody move with its rollback.

Six questions for the CISO

  1. For the key that protects your most sensitive data, who holds the credential that can make it unwrap?
  2. Does the service that processes that data in the clear run where your transfer assessment allows?
  3. If your key provider’s contract ended next quarter, how would custody move, and what would stay decryptable meanwhile?
  4. When was your key-encryption key last rotated, and can you show it from a record you did not write?
  5. When a wrapping key is retired, can you prove it was destroyed at the provider and not only deactivated?
  6. Can any vendor act inside your environment without a time-boxed grant you issued and can revoke?

Bring your custody clause.

The one that says the keys stay. Fifteen minutes on a live deployment to show it as a setting, against an account you control.

Book the demo