A regulator set a date
NIS2, DORA, a central-bank circular, or an executive order that directs a federal procurement rule on FIPS 203, 204 and 205. You need a plan with evidence, not a statement of intent.
ANKASecure© migrates existing encrypted data and signatures to NIST post-quantum algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) without exposing plaintext: the payload is decrypted and re-encrypted under a fresh content key inside the control plane, in streaming with bounded memory, without the plaintext ever being written to disk, logged or returned to the caller, and a companion operation re-signs. A policy template aligned with NIST, NSA CNSA 2.0, BSI, ANSSI, ETSI or CRYPTREC enforces the target across every application in under a second, PKCS#12 keystores are imported through a seven-stage validation pipeline, and composite hybrid keys require both the classical and the post-quantum component to decrypt. Every step is recorded in a signed, tamper-evident audit trail. Discovery and inventory of the existing estate are delivered by ANKATech channel partners.
Harvest now, decrypt later is not a forecast — it is an accounting problem with a date attached. Migrating to post-quantum algorithms means re-encrypting what already exists, and the usual answer is to decrypt it in every application that wrote it. ANKASecure© does it inside the platform, without exposing plaintext.
Is this you
NIS2, DORA, a central-bank circular, or an executive order that directs a federal procurement rule on FIPS 203, 204 and 205. You need a plan with evidence, not a statement of intent.
It asks which algorithms protect their data and when you will move. Nobody in the building can answer it across all the applications.
Your retention period is longer than the window anyone trusts. The exposure already exists, and it grows every day you keep writing with the current algorithm.
Who signs this: A CISO or head of cryptography with a dated obligation, a budget line, and an application estate they do not personally control. If cryptography still lives in each team’s code, this is the conversation.
Why existing approaches fall short
Transport cryptography negotiates its algorithms per session, so upgrading it changes what happens from now on. Data at rest is different: it was encrypted under long-lived keys, by applications that chose the algorithm in their own code, and it stays exposed for as long as it is kept. Upgrading the channel and swapping the library are both necessary. Neither moves what already exists.
What it protects
Data already encrypted under RSA or elliptic-curve keys
Signatures already issued
Where the algorithm decision lives
The next transition, from hybrid to post-quantum only
An organization moves its edge to hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3, and every new session is protected. The nightly database backup it has written for years is not. Its data keys are wrapped under RSA, it is retained for ten years because a regulation requires it, and copies sit at a recovery site and with a cloud provider. The EU roadmap calls data that must stay confidential for ten years or more a high-risk use case. The TLS upgrade changed none of it. Moving it means opening every application that wrote it, or moving the data under a new key without them.
Four primary sources. One point in common: the data already stored.
OMB M-26-15
NIST IR 8547
BSI TR-02102-1
EU coordinated implementation roadmap
How it works
The applications keep calling the same operation. What changes is what the control plane decides to do underneath.
Pick the policy template your obligation names — NIST, NSA CNSA 2.0, BSI, ANSSI, ETSI, CRYPTREC and more. ANKASecure© starts refusing key material that does not satisfy it, everywhere, in under a second. No application ships to make that true.
ANKASecure© imports PKCS#12 keystores through a seven-stage validation pipeline that reports each certificate’s real status and its migration path. A key past its expiry is refused for re-encryption, so the move starts while the keys are still valid.
The payload is decrypted inside the control plane and re-encrypted under a fresh content key, without the plaintext ever being written to disk, logged or returned to the caller; the caller needs a re-encryption grant and no decrypt grant. It streams with bounded memory, so a terabyte archive is the same operation as a 4 KB record, and a companion operation re-signs, so signatures migrate too.
Composite keys pair a classical and a post-quantum component and require both to decrypt — the AND-decrypt mode. If one component is broken, the payload is not. ANKASecure© deliberately does not implement the OR-decrypt variant.
Hybrid done right
The most credible critics of hybrid cryptography are the standards bodies themselves. NIST IR 8547 says hybrid solutions add complexity that can increase security risk and cost, and expects them to be temporary measures leading to a second transition to post-quantum algorithms only. OMB M-26-15 calls hybrid an intricate and resource-intensive stopgap. BSI and the EU roadmap recommend it anyway. Both positions hold: hybrid is worth having when it is built to a standard and built to be left.
A composite encryption key requires both components to decrypt, and a composite signature is valid only when both components verify. ANKASecure© implements exactly these two modes. A mode in which either component alone decrypts is deliberately absent: it would turn the hedge into a second way in.
The two shared secrets are combined with the key combiner of NIST SP 800-227, instantiated with HKDF, or with the CatKDF and CasKDF of ETSI TS 103 744. Composite signatures follow the IETF composite ML-DSA construction.
A composite key is only as strong as its weakest component. Ed25519 with ML-DSA-44 is a quantum-safe hybrid at level 1, so a rotation policy that forbids downgrades refuses it as the successor to an ML-DSA-87 key.
Within hybrid, a key rotates to another composite under the same identifier. Leaving hybrid for post-quantum only uses a successor key: the old one is revoked as ALGORITHM_DEPRECATED, so it still decrypts and verifies, and the data moves by the same re-encryption that brought it into hybrid.
Re-encryption does not hand anyone the plaintext. The caller holds a re-encryption grant from the source key to the target key and needs no decrypt grant on either. The payload is decrypted and re-encrypted inside the platform under a fresh content-encryption key, and the plaintext is never returned to the caller.
Mosca’s inequality
Mosca’s inequality, which NIST IR 8547 cites, sets the frame. If X is how long data must stay secure, Y is how long the transition takes and Z is when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists, data is exposed whenever X plus Y exceeds Z. Z is outside anyone’s control. X is set by retention rules and contracts. Y is the only variable an organization owns, and NIST notes that past transitions took ten to twenty years from standardization to full integration. For data at rest, Y has two parts: the time until the organization stops writing under quantum-vulnerable algorithms, and the time to move what it has already written.
Data in transit
New data at rest
Existing data at rest
Long-lived signatures
Old key material
The order matters. First stop adding to the exposure, which is a policy decision; then move what exists, starting with the data whose X is longest. Discovery tells you where the exposure is. Re-encryption is what reduces it.
Post-quantum adoption measured over a real estate, not estimated — the classical, post-quantum and hybrid split, and every algorithm in use ranked by how many keys hold it. The number you start from is usually the uncomfortable one.
Fifteen minutes
Live, on your data shape, against a real deployment. Nothing in this list is a mock-up or a roadmap item.
A file encrypted under RSA. The envelope, and the key it points at.
The policy is tightened to a post-quantum minimum. The next key generation is refused, with the reason.
Re-encryption to ML-KEM. Memory stays flat while the file streams. No plaintext anywhere you can point at.
The old envelope still opens, because the old key was retired and not destroyed. The lifecycle state that makes that a rule rather than a favour.
The audit trail for every step, signed, with the algorithm, key and outcome of each operation.
Your question, answered on the deployment rather than on a slide.
Same destination, different routes
The deadlines are on the post-quantum page, and they converge on 2035. What differs is the route: whether to pass through hybrid, for how long, and what the architecture must be able to do afterwards. An organization with operations in more than one jurisdiction may answer to several of these at once.
NIST IR 8547 (final, October 2026)
OMB M-26-15 (June 2026)
BSI TR-02102-1 (version 2026-01)
EU coordinated implementation roadmap (June 2025)
Under NIST’s own reading, hybrid leads to a second transition. An estate that can re-encrypt once can do it twice. One that rewrote its applications to reach hybrid will rewrite them again to leave it.
The algorithm availability policy is set deployment-wide and per tenant: a BSI hybrid-enforced template for one subsidiary and a NIST-aligned one for another, both enforced on every operation of the same installation.
OMB asks for a risk-based prioritization and a plan for a cryptographically agile architecture. Every re-encryption is recorded in the signed audit trail with its source and target algorithm, and the classical, post-quantum and hybrid split of live keys is a report, not a survey.
What it rests on
Shipping
Re-encryption and re-signing without plaintext exposure
Compact and streaming, bounded memory at any file size.
Shipping
120+ algorithms
The NIST post-quantum set (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA), FALCON and HQC alongside the classical and regional families, plus 41 composite hybrid pairings.
Shipping
37 policy templates
29 of them algorithm-availability templates, 6 rotation and 2 lifecycle; 24 of the availability templates tied to a named standard or jurisdiction.
Shipping
PKCS#12 import
Seven-stage validation pipeline with certificate status and migration-path analysis.
Shipping
Signed audit trail
Tamper-evident chain, queryable per tenant, forwardable to your SIEM with the signature preserved.
Per channel
Discovery and inventory
What your estate uses today, delivered by ANKATech channel partners. Discovery produces visibility; the control plane produces control.
The framework
The Cryptographic Control Plane reference architecture describes each pillar through the scenarios it must handle and one practical test. This solution is two of those scenarios, and it is measured against their tests.
01
Primary pillar
Scenario realised
Transitioning to post-quantum cryptography
Practical test
“Can the cryptographic strategy change without requiring an application change or release?”
03
Primary pillar
Scenario realised
Modernizing historical encrypted data
Practical test
“Can the protection of data encrypted years ago be changed today, without the originating application and without plaintext at rest?”
04
Supporting pillar
Scenario realised
Enforcing a new enterprise security requirement
Practical test
“Can the organization prove, by querying the control plane, which policy applied to a given operation, and change that policy centrally?”
Maturity move
From algorithms hardcoded in application code to a Control Plane where an algorithm change is a policy update. The migration itself is the step from level 2 to level 3; keeping it that way is level 4.
It does not find your cryptography for you. Inventory across an estate is a discovery engagement, and ANKATech partners run it.
It does not re-encrypt data it cannot reach. Anything held by a system that will not delegate the operation stays where it is.
It does not certify you. ANKASecure© maps its controls to NIST CSWP 39, the GSA PQC Buyer’s Guide and OWASP and hands you the evidence; the determination is still your auditor’s.
Where to start
Programs stall when a complete inventory becomes the precondition for any action: the estate keeps writing under quantum-vulnerable algorithms while it is being measured. Discovery is necessary, and it runs in parallel. It does not have to come first.
1
New applications stop embedding cryptography. They encrypt and sign against stable key identifiers under a post-quantum or hybrid policy from their first release, so nothing new joins the stock.
2
The handful of systems whose data must stay confidential longest, which a CISO can usually name without a scanner. Their keys come in, their data is re-encrypted and their signatures re-signed, without changing the applications that wrote them.
3
The inventory of the rest of the estate, delivered by ANKATech partners, onboarding systems by risk as it progresses. It informs the other two tracks and blocks neither.
After this
No new deployment, no second contract for the platform. A Door B customer activating Door C is a configuration and a new conversation.
A terabyte archive, an expired certificate, a format nobody owns. Fifteen minutes on a live deployment.
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