A regulator set a date
NIS2, DORA, a central-bank circular, or a federal procurement rule that names FIPS 203, 204 and 205. You need a plan with evidence, not a statement of intent.
ANKASecure© migrates existing encrypted data and signatures to NIST post-quantum algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) without decrypting the payload: the data key is re-wrapped inside the control plane, in streaming with bounded memory, and the same operation re-signs. A policy template aligned with NIST, NSA CNSA 2.0, BSI, ANSSI, ETSI or CRYPTREC enforces the target across every application in under a second, PKCS#12 keystores are imported through a seven-stage validation pipeline, and composite hybrid keys require both the classical and the post-quantum component to decrypt. Every step is recorded in a signed, tamper-evident audit trail. Discovery and inventory of the existing estate are delivered by ANKATech channel partners.
The data you encrypted last year is already collected.
Harvest now, decrypt later is not a forecast — it is an accounting problem with a date attached. Migrating to post-quantum algorithms means re-encrypting what already exists, and the usual answer is to decrypt it first. ANKASecure© removes that step.
CISOHead of cryptographySecurity architect
Is this you
Three ways this lands on your desk
A customer sent a questionnaire
It asks which algorithms protect their data and when you will move. Nobody in the building can answer it across all the applications.
Someone did the HNDL maths
Your retention period is longer than the window anyone trusts. The exposure already exists, and it grows every day you keep writing with the current algorithm.
Who signs this: A CISO or head of cryptography with a dated obligation, a budget line, and an application estate they do not personally control. If cryptography still lives in each team’s code, this is the conversation.
How it works
Four moves, none of them a rewrite
The applications keep calling the same operation. What changes is what the control plane decides to do underneath.
Declare the target, once
Pick the policy template your obligation names — NIST, NSA CNSA 2.0, BSI, ANSSI, ETSI, CRYPTREC and more. ANKASecure© starts refusing key material that does not satisfy it, everywhere, in under a second. No application ships to make that true.
Bring the existing keys in
ANKASecure© imports PKCS#12 keystores through a seven-stage validation pipeline that reports each certificate’s real status and its migration path. Expired material is imported deliberately, because data encrypted under it still has to be readable.
- Patent pending
Re-encrypt without exposing plaintext
The data key is unwrapped and re-wrapped inside the control plane. The payload is never decrypted to storage, never to a log, and never to the caller. It streams with bounded memory, so a terabyte archive is the same operation as a 4 KB record — and the same operation re-signs, so signatures migrate too.
- REENCRYPT
- RESIGN
- streaming, bounded memory
- no plaintext egress
Hedge while the standards settle
Composite keys pair a classical and a post-quantum component and require both to decrypt — the AND-decrypt mode. If one component is broken, the payload is not. ANKASecure© deliberately does not implement the OR-decrypt variant.
Where the migration actually stands
Post-quantum adoption measured over a real estate, not estimated — the classical, post-quantum and hybrid split, and every algorithm in use ranked by how many keys hold it. The number you start from is usually the uncomfortable one.
Fifteen minutes
What you will actually watch
Live, on your data shape, against a real deployment. Nothing in this list is a mock-up or a roadmap item.
A file encrypted under RSA. The envelope, and the key it points at.
The policy is tightened to a post-quantum minimum. The next key generation is refused, with the reason.
Re-encryption to ML-KEM. Memory stays flat while the file streams. No plaintext anywhere you can point at.
The old envelope still opens, because the old key was retired and not destroyed. The lifecycle state that makes that a rule rather than a favour.
The audit trail for every step, signed, with the policy decision recorded next to the operation.
Your question, answered on the deployment rather than on a slide.
What it rests on
The capabilities underneath, with their state
Shipping
Re-encryption and re-signing without plaintext exposure
Compact and streaming, bounded memory at any file size.
Shipping
120+ algorithms
The NIST post-quantum set (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA), FALCON and HQC alongside the classical and regional families, plus 41 composite hybrid pairings.
Shipping
29 policy templates
29 of them algorithm-availability templates, and 24 of those tied to a named standard or jurisdiction.
Shipping
PKCS#12 import
Seven-stage validation pipeline with certificate status and migration-path analysis.
Shipping
Signed audit trail
Tamper-evident chain, queryable per tenant, forwardable to your SIEM with the signature preserved.
Per channel
Discovery and inventory
What your estate uses today, delivered by ANKATech channel partners. Discovery produces visibility; the control plane produces control.
The framework
Where this sits in CAPA
The Cryptographic Control Plane reference architecture describes each pillar through the scenarios it must handle and one practical test. This solution is two of those scenarios, and it is measured against their tests.
01
Primary pillar
Crypto-Agility
Scenario realised
Transitioning to post-quantum cryptography
Practical test
“Can the cryptographic strategy change without requiring an application change or release?”
03
Primary pillar
Frictionless Modernization
Scenario realised
Modernizing historical encrypted data
Practical test
“Can the protection of data encrypted years ago be changed today, without the originating application and without plaintext at rest?”
04
Supporting pillar
Cryptographic Governance & Compliance
Scenario realised
Enforcing a new enterprise security requirement
Practical test
“Can the organization prove, by querying the control plane, which policy applied to a given operation, and change that policy centrally?”
L1–L2L3–L4
Maturity move
From algorithms hardcoded in application code to a Control Plane where an algorithm change is a policy update. The migration itself is the step from level 2 to level 3; keeping it that way is level 4.
What this does not do
It does not find your cryptography for you. Inventory across an estate is a discovery engagement, and ANKATech partners run it.
It does not re-encrypt data it cannot reach. Anything held by a system that will not delegate the operation stays where it is.
It does not certify you. ANKASecure© maps its controls to NIST CSWP 39, the GSA PQC Buyer’s Guide and OWASP and hands you the evidence; the determination is still your auditor’s.
After this
The same installation already does these
No new deployment, no second contract for the platform. A Door B customer activating Door C is a configuration and a new conversation.
Bring your worst file.
A terabyte archive, an expired certificate, a format nobody owns. Fifteen minutes on a live deployment.
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